r/CredibleDefense • u/AutoModerator • 17d ago

Active Conflicts & News Megathread August 22, 2025

The r/CredibleDefense daily megathread is for asking questions and posting submissions that would not fit the criteria of our post submissions. As such, submissions are less stringently moderated, but we still do keep an elevated guideline for comments.

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u/johnbrooder3006 17d ago

A major disadvantage Ukraine has faced since 2022 is trying to restore/maintain military hardware production under constant threats of Russian aerial attacks. Expectedly they’ve relied on western exports which arrive out of the box and ready to use from NATO protected countries. They also domestically produce FPV’s in pop up workshops across the country, fortunately these are relatively mobile and can be shifted quickly. However anything larger than that becomes an enormous liability, and it got me thinking since the announcement of their Flamingo missile. Several accurate strikes on the manufacturing plant could be absolutely catastrophic (I wouldn’t be surprised if that’s what they were looking for in western Ukraine two nights ago). My question is, can Ukraine lease warehouses in adjacent NATO countries to rebuild their own heavy weapon systems? Sure there’s logistical issues but the benefits would definitely outweigh the cost. No doubt Russia could say escalation but how’s it different to a storm shadow being manufactured on NATO soil then sent across the border ready to fire?

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u/Electrical-Lab-9593 17d ago

yeah, i think building them should be fine as long as the warheads/rdx etc are added in Ukraine, not sure you would want them being armed in your country, its too much room for sabotage

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u/Moifaso 17d ago

That Ukraine and one of the western partners still haven't figured out a way to set up proper factories of cheap Ukrainian-designed drones outside Ukrainian territory just baffles me. A few real factories are always going to be much more efficient than the hundreds of small workshops and decentralized production Ukraine relies on.

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u/roionsteroids 17d ago

10000 drones spelling the location of proper factories in the air

When it comes to the super cheap lowest end of drones though (like a $200 FPV one) - even 10 million of these are a rather small expense in the grand scheme of things. Rapid design changes and near real time constant improvements make it difficult to settle on one design for mass production. The modularity (plethora of different batteries, cameras, antennae, rotors and what not suppliers) is a feature rather than a bug.

It's the same for Russia, they haven't really standardized one lowest low end drone design for mass production and throw some money at these workshops instead. Some of the bigger ones may receive a "branded product" name like VT-40, but they're probably iterating as much as everyone else too.

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u/BigFly42069 17d ago

The Flamingo missile uses the AI-25TL turbofan engine, which is produced by Motor Sich. The company has factories in Zaphorizhzhia, Snizhne, and Volochysk. Of the three sites, Snizhne is in Donetsk, and the only biggest operator of the AI-25TL is the L-39 Albatros, where the only western operator is the Czech Republic.

For now, what Ukraine is doing is ripping these old AI-25TLs out from their domestic supplies to put into the Flamingo, but eventually they'll run up against a dwindling supply.

So it makes sense for them to concentrate as much of the production as they can in a single place. Because if they were to disperse production, they won't achieve the scale necessary to actually put out the numbers they need right now.

If Ukraine shifts production to NATO countries, there is still a need to transport munitions from said NATO countries to Ukraine and to the frontlines. The increase in logistical burden decreases availability of munitions due to physics (longer supply line takes more time to move things), and they need the fires now so they can accept this trade off in risk.

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u/ChornWork2 17d ago

I don't understand why nato hasn't explicitly made x miles from border part of its own air defense zone. easy to justify and then ukraine can use that buffer for defense manufacturing, training, etc.

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u/Culinaromancer 17d ago

Because it boils down to lack of political will. Everything else is a function of political will. The nonsense about lack of stock of missiles and other assets is just smoke cover.

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u/Tealgum 17d ago

Deconflicton is the biggest reason. It’s why they aren’t stopping shaheds either.

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u/ChornWork2 17d ago

I'd understand that if either ukraine or russia was operating combat aircraft, but not going to see that in the corner where have border area with Romania, Hungary and Slovakia.

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u/TestingHydra 17d ago

Because NATO missile stocks are already under strain providing to Ukraine. Doing what you suggest would put further strain on it and could lead to Ukraine receiving less missiles because NATO would need to preserve their stockpiles.

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u/ChornWork2 17d ago edited 17d ago

I didn't think that Air-to-air missiles capable of addressing at least the drones and cruise missiles are particularly in short supply.

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u/BigFly42069 17d ago

This is the real answer. People aren't aware just how low the procurement rates are for anti-air missiles. For example, the US expended 100 THAAD interceptors against Iran's missile attacks on Israel, and only buys something like 16 a year. Meanwhile, SM-2 production is closer to 60 per year and Congress keeps trying to shut down that line in favor of the one that does... 24 a year.

PAC-2 and PAC-3 missiles are more or less in the same boat, and AAMs productions across the entirety of the western military supply chain is also far lower than people imagine.

Budget isn't a magical thing that you can just change on the fly but has to be planned out years in advance, changes don't just magically come out of nowhere.

And for all the chest-thumping that we're doing about how we'll scale up production of 155mm shells and other munitions in the future, the current present stock and present procurement rates were set in stone years ago.

There's a real possibility that the western military industrial supply chain of the 21st century isn't as adaptive and scalable as the MIC supply chain of the early 20th century, but people continue to believe that it is. Maybe by 2027 to 2030, western MIC will have started to turn it around and scale up sufficiently to meet the needs that were demanded in 2022-2023, but this will come at the expense of reduced budgetary availability for non-military needs because once again: budget isn't a magical thing.

And that's before we even start considering the possibility that the security landscape might change enough by then to the point that the scaleup is either no longer needed or inadequately scaled up yet again.

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u/colin-catlin 17d ago

This answer seems deliberately biased in having solid facts that are clearly cherry picked, even if the discussion is valid. The main counterpoint is the US does much better on ship based SAMs and air to air weapons, as those are the primary systems the US plans to use. And here are counterpoints for those directly mentioned, land based: 500 pac-3 missiles were produced in 2024 and growing https://www.lockheedmartin.com/en-us/news/features/2025/lockheed-martins-pac-3mse-achieves-record-production-year.html 155 mm shells are up three fold already, not in the future as specified there https://www.defenseone.com/defense-systems/2025/06/army-expects-make-more-million-artillery-shells-next-year/406132/

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u/BigFly42069 17d ago

We can try and spin all of these as victories, and they are incremental progress (gotta make progress somehow), but the numbers themselves betray the reality between what the headlines say and what the situation demands.

From the source citing 155mm shells:

It’s going to miss its goal of making 100,000 per month by October, but likely by just a few months.

The service’s current monthly output stands at 40,000, up from 14,500 when Russia launched its full-scale invasion more than three years ago, according to data provided by the Army. The original plan called for making about twice as many by now.

In other words, it is at 40% of the intended goal of 100,000 shells per month at the time of writing, and although it's tripled production, the base rate from which it was producing shells was what Russia and Ukraine were firing at each other in a single day last year.

As for Lockheed, it's ramped up production of 500, which represents a 30% increase YOY from what the 350 it produced in 2023 (a 150 round increase), with an expected increase of 20% YOY for 2025 to 600 (a 100 round increase) and then 650 (a 50 round increase) by 2027.

In the meantime, there are 480+ MIM-104 launchers in the US inventory alone, with 250 launchers operated by foreign buyers.

Taken as a number in a vacuum, the PAC-3 numbers look great. But that's before you apply that number to the operational needs of Ukraine alone: 7 batteries and 9 additional launchers from last available open data source, which means they're operating anywhere between 51 to 65 launchers.

With 12 PAC-3 MSE to 16 PAC-3 CRI per launcher, Ukraine alone needs anywhere between 816 to 1040 PAC-3 rounds to achieve a full reload for their existing systems. Obviously, they're not firing off everything because they use Patriots to primarily defend against RU ballistic missiles, but the point still stands that production is lagging demand.

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u/Tristancp95 17d ago

What if Russia warns that any GBAD shooting down their drones will be considered valid military targets? And then proceeds to strike just one launcher in Polish territory, with 0 civilian casualties?  

Now Poland/NATO are in a difficult decision. Do they strike back, effectively starting a hot war with Russia at a time when the European economy is teetering and the US is unreliable at best? A war that the majority of Europeans do not want to be actively fighting in? 

Or does Poland give Russia a pass for blowing up their hardware and killing servicemen on their territory, and thus look weak to their population while also encouraging Russia to continue escalating? What happens when Russia continues to strike more and more GBAD in Polish territory? At what point does it become impossible to avoid responding?  

I know this reads as a slippery slope, but that’s how it goes when you’re playing chutes and escalation ladders. 

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u/ChornWork2 17d ago

what if russia launches a nuke because we gave ukraine a leopard tank?

if we think russia losing is an unacceptable risk, then what are doing?

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u/Tristancp95 16d ago

what if russia launches a nuke because we gave ukraine a leopard tank?  

The nuclear scenario feels the same as hitler comparisons with how they are used in arguments nowadays 

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u/ChornWork2 16d ago edited 16d ago

this isn't vietnam war with soviet/china escalation risk. ukraine is core to fundamental european security interests and should be treated as such. all the hemming and hawing about escalation has not only led to tragically more death/damage but also actually higher escalation risk. Decisively halting the russian advance on the ground and defending ukrainian airspace is not going to lead to putin to do something crazy.

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u/Tristancp95 15d ago

I mean yeah, I mostly agree with you. But that’s not the way European leaders are approaching it, and you and I aren’t going to convince them otherwise

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u/ChornWork2 15d ago

Totally understand the political dithering you get when have large group of politicians trying to balance their own set of political risks. Not suggesting the situation is anything but political reality, but my point is objectively speaking the talk of escalation risk doesn't have a lot of objective weight to it. But them embracing it is politically easier for them, as opposed to actually trying to lead.

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u/Electrical-Lab-9593 17d ago

would a lot of the borders be at the extreme ranges of GBAD ? or would they have batteries close to the border

also maybe the hustle of a metropolis means you can hide things in the chaos, but sat intel is going to show that one factory on the border, and sabotage will happen?

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u/ChornWork2 17d ago edited 17d ago

presumably need GBAD close to border at portion of nato borders close to odesa or near belarus b/c don't want nato planes flying around there. but for much of border with poland, slovakia, hungary and romania you could probably accomplish largely with aircraft. lots of advance notice at that range and presumably able to use missiles that are more abundant in supply.