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u/rnev64 Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
superb quality post;
but some important things went unmentioned.
the attack in Syria was carried out to eliminate an imminent attack on Israel (hence the irregular acknowledgment of it by Israel - though elections may have played part). some evidence was provided to support this by at least one Iranian journalist considered government affiliated that publicly warned Israel with pretty specific words a few days before. this UAV attack was allegedly to be a response to (alleged) Israeli UAV attacks in Iraq and Yemen. the IDF also released video (allegedly!) showing the drone carrying unit in Syria before it was bombed.
without this important piece of information conclusion of the reader is that Israel must be war mongering at this time.
your overall assessment of Israel's position is also missing some important information or not quite accurate. most important is that few in Israel expect a clean and easy war - there are known and unknown offensive tunnels dug by Hizbulla and well over one hundred thousand rocket artillery pieces aimed at Israeli towns and cities. Israel fully expects the next war to be as painful to Israeli civilians and infrastructure as previous wars have been to Lebanese. but it also understands that the longer this war is put off the worst it would be.
so while i do agree that Israel is looking to change the equation and a war is certainly possible - it should not go unmentioned what the ultimate reason may be. it's not "a bone to pick" with Hizbulla. For well over a year Israel has been sending messages to Lebanon via France and the US that it will have no choice but to hold Lebanon accountable to any aggression waged against it from Lebanese soil. Hizbulla's entire pretext for fighting Israel is a couple of farms (literally, less than 10km2) which used to belong to Syria. they claim to be protectors of Lebanon but the truth is if Lebanon was able to enforce sovereignty over its entire area Israel would have no issues with it at all. Israel invaded in 1982 and occupied parts of Lebanon for twenty years because (war torn) Lebanon let attacks be carried out from its territory - but it also retreated back to its border in 2000. yes, Hizbulla made Israel retreat but its continued build up of arms since Israel retreated is only putting Lebanon in jeopardy it wouldn't otherwise be in.
tl;dr
excellent post, truly; however it glosses over some key reasons for recent tension flare and the reasons why Israel may decide to go to war - namely to prevent further Iranian and Iranian-proxy offensive arms buildup in Syria and Lebanon.
full disclosure: i am Israeli
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19 edited Sep 11 '19
Right.
To your first paragraph. What seems to be undeniable is that Israel hit two of the men trained to handle these drones. It seems Nasrallah was speaking the truth that they did indeed hit a Hezbollah R&R center where these two were residing, judging from the pool the target hit. So the truth of that strike to me is a mix of both narratives: Israel hit two Hezb operatives trained and prepared to use drones on Israel while staying at an R&R center owned by the party.
But if the story ended there, there would be an uptick in tension and not a war scare. The make or break issue is the concurrent attack on Beirut. This shows Israel consciously taking a risk towards war for a non-immediately pressing security issue. That's why my perception is 'Israel is pushing buttons' this time, unlike say 2006 which is a war no side expected or 2015 which was an accident that was handled within the 'rules'.
without this important piece of information conclusion of the reader is that Israel must be war mongering at this time.
War mongering is not a word I like. It exudes irrationality and bloodthirst. That's not what I'm aiming for. I'm saying simply given the two crossed red lines and the Israeli response after they were crossed, Israel is ready to do the dirty work regarding Hezbollah's missile program. As I said in my r/Lebanon comment, it looks much better internationally and domestically if a war starts after a Hezbollah response. (to a much smaller extent domestically. My experience is that it's hard to pull a fast one on the Israeli people.) To quote myself,
C) Israel crossed two red lines in one weekend. The reasonable conclusion one can make is that they're baiting Hezbollah into a war as soon as the Hezb enforces the red lines it set. "Israel defends itself from unwarranted Hezb aggression" looks much better internationally than "Israel strikes Beirut, triggering war."
And yes, I agree that the Israeli establishment has been very clear that a war with Hezbollah will hurt. (Like the 'No coffee in Tel Aviv' statements.) As I said in another comment, this is the main reason I'm holding out some hope for peace.
But your point is well taken, so I'll qualify it with Israel achieving a 'relatively' tidy victory.
but it also understands that the longer this war is put off the worst it would be.
That's the sentiment behind my 'rapidly closing window' logic. I even think the establishment believes it's been put off for too long. Even the poor people of the South, some of who I know are already extremely nervous, have been saying "It's been over 10 years without a war. We always felt it was too good to be true."
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u/rnev64 Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
you mention you don't like the term war mongering and i accept that - but you also seem to be focused on who fired the first shot (the alleged target in Beirut was a device used to improve missile accuracy - a red flag for Israel as well). but in geopolitical terms that's hardly the point. the war is result of a long process and should one start Israel is not looking to wage any kind of expansionist war. Israel is looking to preemptively defend from a clear and very present danger that's been building up for years.
and i do agree with the conclusion and overall analysis, ever since the war in Syria was decided i've been saying similar things. from Israel's point of view time is playing against it, the more it lets things continue as they are the more missiles and rockets would be amassed against it and the more accurate they will be.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
the war is result of a long process and should one start Israel is not looking to wage any kind of expansionist war.
Definitely. I think Israel long abandoned any pretenses of expansion, given they can barely manage the Palestinians.
but you also seem to be focused on who fired the first shot
Simply because it tells me that Israel might be ready (as ready as one can be) for war. Hezbollah is absolutely not willing to fight one (because why would it? There's zero benefit.), and will only do so if pushed.
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u/Wesaint101 Aug 31 '19
...if a war starts after a Hezbollah response. (to a much smaller extent domestically. My experience is that it's hard to pull a fast one on the Israeli people.)
Would you say the average Israeli is less inclined towards a conflict than the international community or just that they require more of a casus belli?
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
I'd say they need more of a casus belli. And not because of some special magical power endowed in the Israeli people, for I know that the Lebanese people of the south are the same.
The simple reason is that these people have lived through the horrors of war and wont tolerate it for no good cause.
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Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 28 '20
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
What /u/rnev64 replied to you is spot on.
It's easily forgotten that one of the factors that sew the seeds of Hezbollah's rise is Israeli blunders in the South. When they first came in to kick out the disgraced PLO from South Lebanon, the Israelis were welcomed as liberators by the same people now supporting Hezbollah. But then the blunders began.
It goes to show how important sound long-term oriented policy making is nowadays, something that's lacking virtually everywhere.
But now? Hezbollah capitalizes on the historical persecution of Lebanon's Shiaa, that has existed way before Israel even came to be and peaked with Israel's occupation proper. It promises her people prosperity and riches. That's the main difference between your run of the mill Palestinian terrorist group and Hezbollah, and that's both Hezbollah's greatest strength and greatest weakness.
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u/rnev64 Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
generally speaking, like all organizations, its purpose is itself. in the case of an organization paid by another (Iran) - to also serve its benefactor (aka keep the funding going). Hizbulla's raison d'être was to kick Israel out, well it's out for almost twenty years, so now it's exclusively about self preservation and maintaining power.
as to Iran's goals - power projection, expand as much as you can and when you meet adversity try to weaken it.
of course this has a lot more layers of politics and interests, alliances and old grudges - but to give a general answer i'd say that's about it. we could dive deeper if you think it useful.
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u/timelow Aug 31 '19
Do you think there's any validity in the paranoia felt by Hezbollah & Iran towards Israel?
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u/rnev64 Aug 31 '19
Paranoia? no.
i can understand the historical argument they use in light of Israel's invasion and twenty years staying in the south of Lebanon - but i find it very selective since Israel pulled out in 2000. if it had expansion in mind surely it wouldn't have done that.
but in geopolitical terms i think that's not terribly important - it's mostly a narrative used to rally supporters.
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Aug 31 '19
Whatever Iran orders her to.. I am not an Israeli shill but a southern Lebanese opposed to all forms of imperialist expansionism in my country, be it Saudi, Iranian, Israeli or what have you?
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Aug 31 '19
one Iranian journalist considered regime related
one Iranian journalist affiliated with the government
Just a reminder of the subtle word difference but big meaning difference between using the word regime vs government and its effects on reader.
full disclosure: i am Iranian
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u/rnev64 Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
i'll fix that, thanks!
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Aug 31 '19
Thanks, appreciated!
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u/rnev64 Aug 31 '19
sure, i try to keep comments on this excellent sub as factual as i can but sometimes the Israeli common terminology slips in (IR is always regime). i appreciate the friendly correction.
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u/1Karam1 Aug 31 '19
You’re insight was amazingly useful but I would like to shed some light on this
Hizbulla's entire pretext for fighting Israel is a couple of farms (literally, less than 10km2) which used to belong to Syria
If the entire enmity between Israel and Hezbollah was a couple of farms as you say I think it would have been dealt with by now. We cannot simplify things to this extent. A lot of factors are in play such as ideology,history,religion and a lot more. P.s. From what I’ve heard Syria declared that those farms belong to lebanon a long time ago because they actually are Lebanese.
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u/rnev64 Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
i was actually suggesting exactly that - the farms couldn't possibly be the real reason and that they are used as a ridicules excuse to put Lebanon in the line fire while claiming to be its protector.
certainly there are ideological, historical, religious and geopolitcal causes for the rivalry between Israel and Iran. but that's Israel and Iran - Hizbulla's claim to be Lebanon's protector is pretty much the opposite of reality today - it's in fact using Lebanon as a shield while serving the interests of itself and its masters.
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u/Osapir Aug 31 '19
On one hand, I don't feel like this will amount to much. War is not fun and both sides have other things to do (Hezbollah is a little preoccupied with Syria and Israel with, well, anything else). On the other hand, if Israel thinks war will eventually be inevitable, maybe getting it over with while Hezbollah is on the weaker side is a good option.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
Congratulations.
You just summarized my entire post in two beautiful sentences. Remind me to come to you when I want to make ideas shorter and less rambly.
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u/Osapir Aug 31 '19
Except I don't think we're going to see any serious response from Hezbollah. Maybe something symbolic, just for the record.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
Nasrallah's deputy stressed on the word 'proportional response' to the 'Dahieh incident'.
It's interesting how he didn't mention the Syria incident, so my guess is that Hezbollah will use suicide drones and stick to solely material damage. This will give Israel a chance to step down since her red line wouldn't be crossed.
Two wrenches however: A) Response could be more serious, but that's not likely. All the contradictions coming from Hezb-aligned sources is probably intentional.
B) Israel could respond anyways, since she already made up her mind.
But in terms of most likely scenario, I agree, it won't be serious. And if nothing happens in these coming few days, the 'response' might be delayed until mid-september, which is closer to Israeli elections and also after the Holy period of Ashoura has ended.
Two birds with one stone and all, but who knows.
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u/Osapir Aug 31 '19
The use of bombastic words is a necessity for Nasrallah in order to maintain the "we're tough and still in control" image in front of Hezbollah's supporters. We see these responses from Iran every time something of theirs gets bombed in Syria. We also saw it from Assad when Israel (allegidly) bombed his (alleged) nuclear facility back in 2007.
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u/szu Aug 31 '19
. But here I speculate that Israel expects to hit its target list and sue for peace quickly, hoping that an Iranian desire to get sanctions relief and a Trump-Rouhani meeting come the UNGA will encourage Iran to rein Hezbollah in. In other words, I believe Israel thinks it can get a quick, nice, and tidy victory from this.
How can Trump 'walk back' his sanction? Walking it back and accepting the nuclear deal is almost impossible given that his advisor is John Bolton and since that policy is the centre plank of his Iranian policy.
Also, Israel has all along been against the nuclear deal and that deal is central to any efforts to end sanctions. How can Israel 'win' if the sanctions are eased and the nuclear deal is accepted by Washington again?
The truth is, Israel is in a very tough spot because it failed to anticipate that the Syrian Civil War would destroy the SAA and force Al-Assad to call for aid from Iran. Now they've got Hezbollah on their northern border and they got what is effectively, the IRGC's expeditionary army in Syria fighting the civil war. That army is going to reinforce the Golan Heights once the civil war ends.
So OP, what kind of 'victory' is this? Even reigning in Hezbollah is not restoring the status quo. The situation has already degenerated since the Syrian civil war broke out.
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u/SnakeEater14 Aug 31 '19
To your first point, I would like to point out that Trump isn’t completely leashed to Bolton. He has gone against his word before, and is even putting him in the dog house completely regarding Afghanistan.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
Forgive me to double dip, but I want you to see this. Another sign of the Bolton cooldown, and I'm sure Israel is watching.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
Other than what /u/SnakeEater14 , which is the most recent news in the Trump - Bolton affair, I also want to add a couple of things.
Also, Israel has all along been against the nuclear deal and that deal is central to any efforts to end sanctions. How can Israel 'win' if the sanctions are eased and the nuclear deal is accepted by Washington again?
Here's the reality that I personally feel Israel has a hard time accepting. The US will not do her dirty work regarding Iran. I think it's reasonable to assume that the Israelis hope that the US handles Iran for them, saving them their own blood and treasure. Even if we ignore the many kernels of evidence that betrays this Israeli belief, it's reasonable to assume that any sane actor would love to have her geopolitical problems solved at virtually no expense.
To Israel, a 'win' is regime change. (Although I'm not sure if they still hold that belief so strongly after how Syria turned out for them.) The Trump administration has been consistently saying however, that they do not want regime change. (And here, Iraq's lessons seem to have made a mark on the US.)
My point being, Israel and the US have different goals regarding Iran. When, not if, the US gets tired of wasting energy on this peripheral threat it will leave Israel hanging dry again, which is exactly what happened with the JCPOA. The problem with the JCPOA for the US was not that Israel didn't like it, because it passed despite all the screaming and cardboard pictures Netanyahu brought to congress. The problem with the JCPOA was the timing. There was no regional power ready to step up and challenge Iran when the pressure was relaxed, leading to rapid Iranian expanion. When a sufficient counterbalance rises, (and it seems Turkey is finally ready to pick up that mantle), the 'balance' the US seeks is achieved, and Israel's on her own again.
I'm sure this is rambling and I apologize, but my concluding point is that this is Israel making the best of a worsening hand, not Israel's best case scenario; or a 'win' as you've wondered.
The truth is, Israel is in a very tough spot because it failed to anticipate that the Syrian Civil War would destroy the SAA and force Al-Assad to call for aid from Iran.
Exactly why I hinted above that Israel might've regretted it's overly eager 'Regime change in all my enemies!' position. But maybe they still hold the belief that regime change in Iran proper, the head of the snake, will solve all their boogymen and problems. But that's off-topic, given I'm discussing rolling back Hezbollah's missile progress a couple of years.
Now they've got Hezbollah on their northern border and they got what is effectively, the IRGC's expeditionary army in Syria fighting the civil war. That army is going to reinforce the Golan Heights once the civil war ends.
Yup. Another reason there's a "fast closing window" other than the temporary nature of the US pressure campaign.
So OP, what kind of 'victory' is this? Even reigning in Hezbollah is not restoring the status quo. The situation has already degenerated since the Syrian civil war broke out.
My last sentence kind of hints that I believe Israel will not get the nice tidy victory it seeks. That is the main reason I'm still holding out hope for peace. I think, if Israel launches a skirmish, their 'win' will take the form of a severely degraded Hezbollah missile capability, a quick peace because of relatively shallow Hezbollah and Iran cashflow and Iranian desire to keep Europe on board.
I believe it won't be that simple, but that's another discussion for another time. The purpose of this post was only to read the tea-leaves as to why there's a serious war scare, not how it'll turn out. Maybe if, God Forbid, war breaks out I'll put up a post where we can examine if Israel will really benefit from a skirmish.
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Sep 02 '19
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 03 '19
I just saw this, sorry for the delay.
I disagree with characterisation that (A) US abandoned Israel,
I can see how you could interpret me as saying that the US abandoned Israel from my post, but I can assure you I didn't mean that. Even under Obama, who some would call less than friendly with Israel, there is no doubt that the US would rush to Israeli defense in case of terrible need.
But, after the JCPOA Iran did expand rapidly in the region and despite loud Israel protestations, the US didn't do much. So for the intent of my post, in terms of an anti-Iran front, the US did leave Israel to dry compared to the pre-JCPOA days.
(B) JCPOA was result of US getting tired of wasting energy on Iran.
I stand by this. Other than the small minute details like every US President's hunt for a 'diplomatic legacy' and the war fatigue that took hold in the US, a major factor that pushed the US to pursue the JCPOA was the lack of desire to maintain the international united front against Iran. It was a distracting and draining exercise, and that shouldn't be discounted.
Europe was eager to explore the Iranian market, Russia did not want to see a collapsed (or nuclear) Iran on its doorstep, and China also wanted to see the pressure campaign end and Iran opened up to her. But the US managed to keep them in line pre-JCPOA, for what it knew was a limited time. It could've gone three ways from there:
1) A collapse of the anti-Iran pseudo-coalition
2) JCPOA or something similar
3) The US going it alone
But the international, united pressure campaign remaining indefinitely was no realistic. So it ended up in option 2, which you would be right to call the best of these three options.
However, the "unanticipated" ill-effects of the JCPOA led to a reversion to option 3 due to a resurgent Iran threatening US interests. However, the rest of the world didn't get back on board because their interests were not as threatened. (Although I posit Russia is low-key happy about the pressure to roll Iran back more than most.)
So I agree with you that,
and IMO it was the right decision for US strategic interests at the time
Now it isn't, and we got a reversion. But my point was, the JCPOA was horrible for Israeli strategic interests. It was never not horrible. And the fact that the US went through with it is her putting Israeli interests secondary to US interests. Which is a natural conclusion in geopolitics, but one that would shock the 'Israel is our closest ally' crowd. (Indeed, the cut-throat nature of geopolitics is lost on the crushing majority of people, which is why I love this sub.)
I don't know about timing, however, Bush Administration invasion of both Iraq and Afghanistan, eliminating Iran's great enemies that contained it, enabled Iranian expansion in the first place, after that it was only a matter of time.
Yup, yup, a thousand times yup. The JCPOA was badly timed because there were no strategic balances for Iran, I still stand by that. But I did not say that the JCPOA caused or contributed to the lack of strategic balances. There are other people to blame there, but shifting blame doesn't change the fact that the JCPOA was terribly suited for its environment.
** I find that a lot of analysis regarding JCPOA fall pray to hindsight reasoning and narratives seeking to justify action against Iran. For example, they ignore black swan events such the the arab spring, and its destablising effect on the region.
I disagree. People in the region, both Arabs and Israeli, saw the threat almost instantly. Besides, the Arab Spring, and the Syrian civil war, both kicked off before the JCPOA. So it's not like they came after and ruined a good environment in which it was signed. Said environment never existed.
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Sep 04 '19
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 04 '19 edited Sep 04 '19
I agree with you completely, except on your last statement.
Complex as geopolitics is, expecting Saudi Arabia to counterbalance Iran is sheer stupidity. If one said Turkey and then was proved wrong by the unexpected econonic downturn that hit Turkey or Erdogan getting distracted with his internal consolidation of power, then I'd agree that this was an unforeseeable event that forbade Turkey from balancing Iran.
But no one in their right mind ever presented the Saudis as a proper balance, especially after the Yemen war kicked off and revealed the extent of their incompetence to the world. And it only got worse from there, with blunders in Lebanon, Bahrain, in the Gulf proper, against Turkey, and in Syria.
Edit: But as you said, the US had no other option. Especially with the revelation that Israel energised Obama's efforts to strike a deal through threats of war. So I guess my argument is irrelevant.
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Sep 05 '19
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 05 '19
I argue that the situation was unsustainable. US was over-committed, US solider were fighting (and dying) for local allies who didn't lift a finger to help themselves, US pissed away billions into the sands from which only Iran benefited, etc etc etc.
I agree. As you said, the JCPOA was the best choice at the time and I repeat that it is a victim of its environment which was not ready for it.
With in mind, I think that the Obama administration created a more sustainable situation, setting US on course to win the long game, and that JCPOA was part of that**.
My worry is, by firing that gun early thus setting up the JCPOA for failure he might've used a one time shot. That's my real worry re: the JCPOA. That's because as you implied, the JCPOA is the first real step in setting up a sustainable balance of power in the region that doesn't need the US heavily tipping the scales to keep the peace.
Will we look back and say, "If only the US waited X number of years isntead of wasting the deal"?
I don't know to what extent the administration expected that. But I think this lends to the above i.e. propping Arab coalition todo something.
According to the NYT, it was openly expected that the Arabs pick up their weight and do something. Which is similar to the Trump Administration's logic with other allies, but as you said not with the Arabs. The Trump admin does not intend to rely on incompetence.
Arabs wouldn't accept Turkey leadership. So Saudis --US long standing Ally, ad adversary of Iran and its shia proxies-- seem like the sensible choice, no?
I wouldn't be so sure about Arabs not accepting Turkish leadership. Lebanon is traditionally the 'battleground of the Middle East', so we feel regional trends before everyone else. Turkey has a solid shot in the coming years, but it won't be easy for her.
And yes, Saudi Arabia does seem like a sensible choice if you don't have the best intelligence apparatus in the world telling you that they can't even handle a bunch of berbers on their border using the second best-equipped military in the Middle East. And again, I'm only referencing this event because it's the big one that came before the JCPOA. If we're to list all the messes that came after this space would turn into a comedy club.
Even the current president, who can see how inept the Saudis are, seem to build on this relationship, offering even bigger weapons packages and even considering a civilian nuclear program for them.
This is Trump actually inheriting one of the good things that came out of Obama's JCPOA. A very nervous gulf who is ready to buy weapons.
Trump is treating the Gulf as a cash cow, nothing more nor less. And although he likes showing off big cheques and numbers during white house visits, I think he has Obama to thank for this.
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Sep 06 '19 edited Sep 06 '19
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 06 '19
I'm not comfortable with the framing of "War or JCPOA" as if there were no other option.
The US could've continued an economic pressure campaign and barred Israel from conducting unilateral strikes. It could've also reached a better JCPOA, one that didnt involve Obama protecting Hezbollah's drug network from the DEA and simply hoping that Iran's militia funding problem will simply evaporate into thin air . (Politico had a big expose on the issue.)
As for framing war as inevitable, the Israelis are heroes in their own mind. As the NYT showed, their defense establishment was opposed to a unilateral strike. If the us made it clear in no uncertain terms that all military support in case of a war would be nil, I'm pretty sure that would make the IDF even more opposed to a war.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 04 '19
Forgive me for commenting twice, but the NYT put out a highly relevant article as if it knew what we were talking about.
A quote I want to focus on:
It is a wholly different vision than the one advanced by Obama, who committed to keeping Iran from getting a nuclear weapon but accepted the notion that Iran would become a counterweight to Saudi Arabia’s influence in the region. The two countries would have to “share the neighborhood,” as he put it, an idea that some Trump-administration officials sneer at. As one coolly explains, “We’ve decided to deal with Iran as it is, rather than as we’d like it to be.”
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/04/magazine/iran-strike-israel-america.html
That last sentence is brilliant. Obama in his deal hoped to set up a balance of power, but I am shocked that the American intelligence apparatus couldn't see that Saudi Arabia couldn't be a counter balance to a paper bag. Heck, forget the intelligence apparatus. The fiasco in Yemen alone should've raised huge red flags to anyone with working eyes regarding the theory that Iran and Saudi Arabia are balanced in any way.
And hence the genius of that last sentence. The JCPOA dealt with a fantasy of Iran, a fantasy most of the media still maintains with the foolish 'moderate-extrememist' split, where they confuse variety in domestic politics with variety in basic foreign policy (Ergo, no Iranian faction would ever abandon its proxies and rockets the same way that no US administration will scuttle all the navy's aircraft carriers). The Trump administration is dealing with the reality of Iran, a state that so thoroughly outclasses Saudi Arabia that it would be delusional to speak of any balance.
Also, this article shows how fraught the US-Israel relationship really was, as I posited in my comment. As I said, the article is extremely timely.
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u/pacifismisevil Sep 01 '19
cardboard pictures Netanyahu brought to congress
I believe you're mixing up his UN speech with his congress speech.
It seems overwhelmingly likely that the Israeli elections in 2 weeks time will have no majority possible. They were 1 seat off a majority in the April election, and in every poll since June they've had even fewer seats. Does that have any effect on your analysis?
Suppose a Hezbollah strike kills 1 person, and Netanyahu holds back a response, who would gain seats from that? That seems the likely option to me. I dont see how Israel can win any war, it's inevitable its enemies will get stronger and there's nothing they can do to stop it.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 01 '19 edited Sep 01 '19
Israel promised in no uncertain terms that an injury, not a death, will lead to a strong counter response. And I believe them.
As you said, it's a tough election. Best way to lose it is to set a red line then watch Hezbollah tap dance over it. What remains to be seen is how severe Hezbollah's response will be, but in yesterday's speech he was more conciliatory which still makes me think itll be calculated to avoid casualties.
Edit: There is a chance Hezbollah responds after elections, making a cycle of escalation less likely. They're already probably going to hold back these 10 days, given its Ashoura. It will not look good on them if they ruin this holy period for their base. So why not continue until post elections?
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Aug 31 '19 edited Apr 14 '20
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
the economic recovery was very disappointing for the Iranians.
That is true. I did not add this qualifier because it wasn't really relevant to the argument. I'm focusing on the 'Security threat' perspective of Israel. The JCPOA proved to everyone involved that when the pressure is eased, a large chunk of money will be used for regional expansion.
That's not to say that I subscribe to the idea that economic pain will make them cave.
Very true, and 'Crisis Group' came to the same conclusion about a year ago.
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u/RufusTheFirefly Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
As others have noted, this was a superb post OP -- nice work! And I agree with 90% of your assessment.
There are however some small things I would lightly push back on and one thing I would strongly push back on.
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The first red line involved the IDF bombing a Hezbollah-aligned position (claims differ as to what exactly it was) in Syria and immediately claiming responsibility for it. This strike saw 2 Lebanese members of Hezbollah lose their lives. This crossed a red line established by blood in 2015 (Before continuing, click here and here to read up on this incident.), and by a recent speech by Hassan Nasrallah in January of this year. Said line is, "Any members of the Lebanese Hezbollah killed in Syria by Israeli strikes will be met with a response."
I don't think this is precisely the red line. It's highly likely that Lebanese Hezbollah fighters have been killed in Syria strikes before. In this strike for instance. What made the 2015 incident distinct is not that Hezbollah were killed, but that very high-ranking Hezbollah commanders were killed. I would argue that there is an element of rank involved.
- >It doesn't end there however. Hours after said strike, an even more dangerous 'red line' was crossed. This one was established in the wake of the 2006 war, which saw an end to Israeli strikes on Lebanon that were happening on the regular in the years before. (Similar to what we see in Syria now.) Two suicide drones, apparently launched from a small boat in Lebanese territorial waters, exploded in Hezbollah's South Beirut stronghold. Hezbollah claims these drones targeted their media center (which was indeed damaged), but the British Times claims that the drones' actual target was two trucks carrying sensitive equipment related to Hezbollah's precise missile project.
Unlike the Syria strike which you refer to, this drone attack was not definitely Israeli. Israel did not even hint at culpability, as you noted this is a significant deviation from the Israeli Modus Operandi of the last few years, this appears to be a really, really minor target which wouldn't justify such a deviation and Israeli commentators noted how the drone appeared to bear no resemblance to anything in the Israeli arsenal and rather, looked similar to the locally operated civilian drones Iranian militias use.
But then what could be the logic behind a non-Israeli actor's involvement? I would say there are two possibilities. One is that another, probably Sunni, group in Lebanon was involved. The other is that Iran wants Hezbollah to respond to the strikes against Iranian targets in Syria, but Hezbollah fears the backlash of the Lebanese population if Hezbollah drags them into another Israeli-Lebanese war. So they stage this "attack on Lebanese soil" to justify the response Iran wanted.
That is only a theory however and it is certainly possible there was some especially important precision missile component there and that Israel was behind the attack. It may even be the most likely possibility. But it is by no means definitive.
3.
So using these two 'rules', I can think of five possible scenarios, the first three being likely and the second two much less likely.
I think that a 6th should be added. There is a very real possibility that Hezbollah will attempt to retaliate but will be thwarted by Israeli intelligence or otherwise fail to secure any objective, which would then not necessitate any response from the Israeli side and would allow Hezbollah to walk away having at least tried an attack.
This is what happened with Hezbollah's plan in 2014-2015 to commit a string of global terrorist attacks against Israeli civilian and diplomatic targets. In 2015 Mossad successfully outed Hezbollah cells planning explosive attacks in Thailand, Cyprus and London (their supplies included a ton of Ammonium Nitrate in the Cyprus safehouse and three tons spread around four locations in London). These were foiled completely, obviating the need for any Israeli response. The same is true of the Hezbollah cross-border tunnel project.
- >But here I speculate that Israel expects to hit its target list and sue for peace quickly, hoping that an Iranian desire to get sanctions relief and a Trump-Rouhani meeting come the UNGA will encourage Iran to rein Hezbollah in. In other words, I believe Israel thinks it can get a quick, nice, and tidy victory from this.
This is where I have to strongly disagree. I think you've misread the Israeli perspective entirely (which, coming from a more Lebanese background, is perfectly understandable). Israel has for years been warning that any future war between Israel and Lebanon (motivated and dominated by Hezbollah) would be an ugly one. The Israeli public is intimately aware that there are 100,000 rockets pointed at their cities and that Hezbollah showed no compunction in the last war about firing them indiscriminately. And equally bad, those rocket launch sites are being housed smack in the middle of Lebanese villages.
“It will be a very nasty war,” Amidror said. “A very, very nasty war.” Hezbollah will fire “thousands and thousands” of long-range missiles of improved precision, speed, and range at Israeli population centers, a bombardment larger than Israel’s various layers of missile defense will be able to neutralize in full. “It will be very problematic for us. We don’t have tomorrow morning enough interceptors and they are enhancing their capabilities.”
This will be a blow Israel can withstand. “Israelis will be killed, no question,” Amidror said. “But it’s not going to be catastrophic.” He recalled that during the 2014 war in Gaza, the families of wounded soldiers called on the prime minister to continue the operation from beside their relatives’ hospital beds. “The cabinet didn’t know how to stop the IDF and tell them to retreat back after they destroyed the [Hamas] tunnels because the atmosphere was: Don’t stop, continue.” Amidror’s point was that the Israeli public is willing to withstand even heavy casualties during war if it’s clear the country’s battlefield aims are being achieved.
In Lebanon, the war will inflict unspeakable suffering. Because the interceptors won’t be able to stop the entirety of Hezbollah’s missile barrages, Israel will have to target rockets on the ground before they can be launched—Amidror pointed out that Israel destroyed many of Hezbollah’s Zelzal missiles during the 2006 conflict with the militant group; as a result, none of the rockets was fired at Israel during the war. “Think of about 120,000 rockets and missiles, 50 percent or 80 percent of them stored by the Iranians within populated areas in private houses. Areas will be evaporated. Think about a missile of half a ton, with all the fuel in it, and Israel hits it with only 100 grams of TNT. … Think about what will be damaged just by the stored missiles. Thousands and thousands of Lebanese will be killed and part of Lebanon will be destroyed.” That’s on top of whatever destruction Israel causes when targeting other Hezbollah bases and infrastructure.
Amidror recalled a meeting with Ban Ki-moon during one of the former U.N. secretary-general’s visits to Israel. He showed Ban photos of Hezbollah rockets stored in civilian areas. “Secretary, what should Israel do?” Amidror remembered asking. “These missiles will be launched into Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa, Afula, everywhere. What is your advice to Israel? And I’m telling you if we will hit these missiles, many Lebanese will be killed. Many of them even don’t know that they are neighboring a missile and are totally innocent. You are the secretary-general of the United Nations. What is your advice? He didn’t know what to say, and he said nothing.”
The Israeli national security establishment has two very strong opinions on this subject. 1. As long as Hezbollah dominates Lebanon, this war is almost inevitable. It is just waiting for the spark. 2. It will be very, very ugly and so they should attempt to avoid it at all costs.
All that aside, again I really appreciated your analysis. Thanks!
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
I don't think this is precisely the red line. It's highly likely that Lebanese Hezbollah fighters have been killed in Syria strikes before. In this strike for instance. What made the 2015 incident distinct is not that Hezbollah were killed, but that very high-ranking Hezbollah commanders were killed. I would argue that there is an element of rank involved.
Certainly so. Images released by Hezbollah of the two men tell us three things:
A) They were very close friends, so they worked together.
B) They traveled to Iran together to receive training. (Hezbollah released this!)
C) One of them is the only son of an Al-Manar board member, so it's easy to conclude his father's connections and the training he received abroad makes him at least a middle-level manager.
And as I said elsewhere, the strike on Dahieh and the fact that Israel announced the hit exacerbated it. Much, much harder to sweep it under the rug as Hezbollah would've done elsewhere.
I would say there are two possibilities. One is that another, probably Sunni, group in Lebanon was involved.
I considered this. Not Sunni, but the Druze Walid Joumblatt was on my short list. But if the Druze blew up a critical piece of rocket infrastructure, the tensions we saw between the Hezb and the Druze the past month would be child's play compared to what we'd see now.
And even if it turns out it wasn't Israel who blew up this mixer, which I doubt, Hezbollah strongly believes it is. And if I were Israel and I were about to get drawn into a war, I'm sure I'd deny culpability at the very least if it really wasn't me who conducted the strike.
Also, no one would dare do this in Lebanon at the moment. Hezbollah's power has ballooned considerably as of late, and her enemies have wasted.
possibility is that Iran wants Hezbollah to respond to the strikes against Iranian targets in Syria, but Hezbollah fears the backlash of the Lebanese population if Hezbollah drags them into another Israeli-Lebanese war.
This was also a possibility. But the reports that sensitive equipment got hit makes me doubt that. I entertained this possibility up until the Times revealed what got hit, and the Times' narrative fits the pictures we saw come out more than the Hezb narrative.
At the end of the day, who benefits most from blowing up sensitive rocketry?
I think that a 6th should be added. There is a very real possibility that Hezbollah will attempt to retaliate but will be thwarted by Israeli intelligence or otherwise fail to secure any objective, which would then not necessitate any response from the Israeli side and would allow Hezbollah to walk away having at least tried an attack.
Great point!
The Israeli national security establishment has two very strong opinions here. 1. As long as Hezbollah dominates Lebanon, this war is almost inevitable. It is just waiting for the spark. 2. It will be very, very ugly and so they should attempt to avoid it at all costs.
You're right to strongly push back on this point because it's one I'm the least certain about. So help me out here.
How would Netanyahu benefit from starting what would go down as one of the bloodiest wars in recent Israeli history not even a month away from elections?
Everything fits together in my mind, except this. And as I said twice elsewhere now, the potentially bloody nature of any conflict is my last bastion of hope that's holding out against an escalation.
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u/RufusTheFirefly Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
How would Netanyahu benefit from starting what would go down as one of the bloodiest wars in recent Israeli history not even a month away from elections?
He wouldn't. Keep in mind that not only is Netanyahu in a precarious position with the turnaround second election but his opposition is the so-called "generals' party". Blue and White, Likud's major opponents, are led by four former Israeli Chiefs of General Staff (the person in control of the IDF). This means that even if you believed he would make military moves on a political basis, which I don't personally, it wouldn't help him at all in this election and may well hurt him as it would push the Israeli public to back the more reliable security party, which is his opposition.
In any case, there is no way that Netanyahu or the Israeli establishment are looking for a war here for all the reasons I mentioned above.
That means that either a) the target was a great deal more important than we realize (because what's currently being reported doesn't come close to justifying the attack) to the extent that it's hard for me to even hypothesize what such a target could be or b) Israel was not behind it.
This was also a possibility. But the reports that sensitive equipment got hit makes me doubt that. I entertained this possibility up until the Times revealed what got hit, and the Times' narrative fits the pictures we saw come out more than the Hezb narrative.
At the end of the day, who benefits most from blowing up sensitive rocketry?
I think that leaking the possibility of sensitive equipment being held there just makes the assignation of Israeli blame more believable, thus it would be a reasonable move for Hezbollah if the situation is as I proposed above. They want to make sure the Lebanese public believes that it was an Israeli attack on Lebanese soil. They saw that an attack on the media center was being dismissed as implausible so they leaked a revised motive.
Consider what happened to the drones. One blew up damaging, from the pictures, basically a window. The other was “brought down by local youths throwing stones”. Does that sound like an Israeli drone operation to you? Have you ever heard a report of an Israeli drone in Gaza or Syria being brought down that way or carrying so little explosive ordinance? The whole story seems absurd. How would such a drone even get there? It's too small to make the flight from Israel. It's essentially a DJI hobby drone from the pictures.
I am increasingly leaning towards the explanation that this is Nasrallah attempting to garner support for whatever he or Iran has planned next.
I will also add another alternative. Hezbollah was test-flying/building suicide drones and there was a malfunction and small explosion. Knowing it was going to be reported and not wanting to take the credit for endangering Lebanese by testing weapons in Beirut, they decided to kill two birds with one stone by blaming it on Israel. This way they both shift the blame for the incident and stoke justification for their existence.
This strikes me as the most plausible possibility given the odd collection of facts that have come to light thus far.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
a) the target was a great deal more important than we realize (because what's currently being reported doesn't come close to justifying the attack)
You think it's more important than hitting a critical part of Hezbollah's precision program that managed to make it to Lebanon?
The other was “brought down by local youths throwing stones”.
Which I found hard to believe until a video of the drone's altitude was released. People were literally looking down on it, which is surprising.
They saw that an attack on the media center was being dismissed as implausible so they leaked a revised motive.
To the British Times?
How would such a drone even get there? It's too small to make the flight from Israel.
The official story is from Lebanese waters, from a small boat. But, and I rarely say this given I'm as stubborn as a mule, this makes alot of sense.
I'll also be watching coming events with that in mind. If Hezbollah's response turns out to be 'excessive', and I would qualify the use of any rocket as excessive, then your theory becomes much more likely.
But if Hezbollah's response exudes a massive aura of "Please don't bomb us back!", then it's something else. Your comment is very enlightening, especially the bit on B&W. Thank you.
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u/RufusTheFirefly Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
Which I found hard to believe until a video of the drone's altitude was released. People were literally looking down on it, which is surprising.
Again, not a situation Israeli drones are ever found in. Israel has extremely precise missile technology on their IAI, Elbit and Rafael drones. They don't do suicide missions. They hover above and fire a missile through the window they want to hit.
To the British Times?
They're hardly going to release the information on Al-Manar. And note that the story was reported by the British Times' man in Beirut, not Tel Aviv. There is no one there that could have given him that information outside of Hezbollah. The only question is whether the leaker passed it along of his own volition or whether he was instructed to do so by his superiors. I vote the latter.
I'll also be watching coming events with that in mind. If Hezbollah's response turns out to be 'excessive', and I would qualify the use of any rocket as excessive, then your theory becomes much more likely.
But if Hezbollah's response exudes a massive aura of "Please don't bomb us back!", then it's something else.
It depends on which of my theories you're evaluating. For the first -- that Hezbollah is looking for a way to respond to the attacks on Iranian targets without losing all Lebanese credibility -- you'd be correct. But for the second -- that this is Hezbollah R&D gone wrong that they are trying to spin to their advantage -- I think a response that carries an aura of "please don't bomb us back" or no real response at all would make more sense.
/u/rnev64 I wonder what your take on these possibilities is?
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
Hezbollah R&D gone wrong getting spinned as an Israeli attack on Dahieh is a horrible idea.
To paraphrase the sentiment I got from my more wealthy friends in the south, "People here have nothing else better to do than war" (Referring to the horrible economic situation.)
In other words, by framing it as an attack on South Beirut, Hezbollah has given its people the expectation of a proper response. There are much better ways to spin this that don't involve attacking Israel.
Your first theory however, seems sound to me and only time will tell us if you're right or not. I'll be replying to this comment whenever something happen, even if weeks away.
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Aug 31 '19
Sorry for interrupting, but I wonder how much will Hezbollah benefit from destabilizing the already fragile economic and political situation in Lebanon? Is it plausible to assume they want to seize the opportunity and grab a better hold of the country when it’s weaker? Can you tell the pros and cons for hezb regarding distabiliztaion?
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
While it's hard to predict, my guess is that Hezbollah would benefit if its enemies would become even more bankrupt. Let me put it this way.
The wealth of alot of our feudal lords, as I like to call them, is based on robbing the state dry. Only Hezbollah and whoever Saudi Arabia choose to support (there's a dry spell on that front currently, so no one I can name) have an international source of funding. So logically, a broke state would mean poorer feudal lords all around, except if they can guarantee some exterior income.
However, right now said exterior income is a bit dry. With the US cracking down on Hezbollah's international money making networks and Iran's cash flow, it's an open secret that Hezbollah is having some money issues at the moment. Heck, about a year ago, Nasrallah even started asking for donations from his supporters.
So it's a meh thing for Hezbollah, where it's neither a clear loss nor a clear win.
However, there's something else. The overvalued Lebanese Lira. To be brief, our feudal government has relied on an extremely generous public sector to keep all the different groups in line. You're loyal to your leader? Here, get a cushy government job.
This has led to our already stratospheric deficit and debt burden breaking a new record. For a while now, there have been rumors that our ruling elite are looking for an excuse to devalue the lira from its overvalued peg. It would ensure that
A) The Government's debt burden suddenly halves. (If they halve the value of the Lira, that is.)
B) Less money leaves the country, as the cushy government jobs always manage to find a way to squander all their LBP in Turkey thus widening our deficit. A weaker Lira would make it, and other similar forms of 'luxury imports' harder.
So if a conflict does break out, I wouldn't be surprised if our ruling elite, the pro and the anti Hezbollah, use it as an excuse to devalue the Lira and blame Israel. But that's a pet theory. The devaluation is nigh inevitable, how it comes about however is a matter of debate. (indeed, Al Nahar already argued that there's a sort of shadow devaluation.)
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Aug 31 '19
What about the Iranian-hezb tactic of stressing the country to weaken it gradually as they tried with Israel? Without engaging in actual war, they use psychological warfare to scare and demoralize the country’s people in hope to hurt their response and stamina in times of war (make them oversensitive to casualties, etc), and try to make the country spend more on military and less on other essential stuff? I see those symptoms happening in Lebanon - massive brain drain of young and secular who could serve hezb’s opposition, massive public spendings, social polarization and more.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
This is all happening in Lebanon, yes, but the Hezb is not to blame.
Even if Hezbollah had such long-term planning, it does not have the capacity or strength to ruin the country on its own. In other words, it takes two to tango. Or in Lebanon's case, eighteen!
Hezbollah doesn't touch the other fiefdoms. It tried in 2008 and got a bloodied nose. What Hezbollah does do is try to control certain key aspects of the state that it needs while leaving the rest to be divvied up between the other players. It's aware that if it pushes too much, the country gets pushed into civil war which is something that would benefit no one.
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u/rnev64 Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
/u/rnev64 I wonder what your take on these possibilities is?
it's a long thread - but i'd say the important thing is not who started or who bombed whom first or who downed who's drone. none of the tactical stuff really matters in geopolitics except for perception management (which matters some).
the bottom line for me is that Hizbulla in Lebanon was something Israel could maybe "live with" though very uneasily. but since the Syrian proxy conflict was decided - the buildup of pressure has increased substantially and Israel can no longer sit by for long. the outcome of the Syrian civil/proxy war sees the two nations come almost into direct contact. at the same time arming Hizbulla though Syria is something Iran can now do more easily without Israel or anyone else being able to do much about it (before the war Assad was careful not to assist Iran too much).
so the important things are the causes for war that have been building up, some for years, not how it happens to be triggered.
Israel has been trying diplomacy with Moscow and Washington to try and limit Iran's presence in Syria away from the Israeli border. it also made diplomatic efforts well before the current escalation - but if all else fails Israel cannot let the arsenal of rockets and missiles just grow while it sits idly by.
in that sense it's really meaningless who launches the first strike since the war has been long in the making. i have no problem saying my own nation is indeed gearing for war - the important thing in my eyes is to try and shed light on why that is the case. there's nothing wrong with wanting war if it's truly preemptive and for self defense - and i think nobody can seriously claim that Israel has any expansionism in mind and that this war should it come is the very definition of preemptive.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
(before the war Assad was careful not to assist Iran too much).
Thank you for saying this. I want to go one step further and point out that during the Iraq war, Iran and Syria were equal partners. And that's being generous, as some analysts actually say Iran was more of a junior partner.
I said elsewhere in this thread that I would guess Israel now regrets her eagerness and support to see the end of Assad and his strong central rule over Syria. One would think they would've predicted Iran benefits most when there is no strong central state, but seems not.
Today, the only thing keeping Iranian influence in Syria in check is Russia, who spent blood and treasure to carve out her piece and doesn't intend to lose Syria to Iran.
If Israel truly is gearing for war, I do hope they have a proper long term plan in place so that the war doesn't have to repeat itself every decade. If the Israeli track record in Gaza and Syria is any indication, I shouldn't cross my fingers.
If there's something everyone in this tinderbox of a region can agree on is that cyclical war is a terrible idea.
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u/rnev64 Aug 31 '19
i agree with your analysis.
i think with hindsight Israel would have preferred Assad to have stayed in full control. in Israel's defense i don't think it had much to do with the causes for the war and it certainly didn't participate beyond assisting certain groups adjacent to its border in order to prevent ISIS from coming too close. there was some glee in Israeli press but that's doesn't mean much. i believe some in Israel warned against a possible unfavorable outcome but it's not like Israel could do anything about it.
as to having a proper plan for the next war - i'm afraid that's likely not the case. war is the last resort but after diplomacy (Moscow as you mentioned carries some power in Syria) fails it becomes the default and it's always a little like throwing the dice. the outcome of the war may be favorable or it may not be but there is a point where a government can no longer sit idly by and do nothing and has to take that chance. i think that's just the reality of things, once we strip away the perception management part of war, but i do share your hope that if war does come it will lead to a more stable region rather than a less stable one.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
The tone suddenly made an about-face in the time between my last comment and this.
Al Mayadeen is saying that 'Israel provided Hezbollah with a list of targets to strike and end the tension but Hezbollah refused' (Which is most likely bull, but Al-Mayadeen is a good source to know what's brewing); and now Nasrallah is going to discuss politics in today's speech. (And no more for the next 10 days, given it's Ashura.)
This could either be Hezbollah stepping down from a retaliation and laying the ground for it, or at least (and probably likely) announcing no action on Ashura. Let's see if his tone is more conciliatory today, if the Al Mayadeen foreshadowing is to be believed.
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u/rnev64 Aug 31 '19
interesting, i do hope things calm down and resolved without conflict and certainly believe Hizbulla has little to benefit from war at this time.
but if i put my geopolitics hat on - sadly it looks like it's going to come sooner or later.
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Aug 31 '19
What happened with the JCPOA? Simply, Iran emerged from decades of economic pressure stronger than ever. In other words, the economic stranglehold was easily reversible. No long-term damage was really done to Iran's capabilities, and Israel ever-so-critical of the JCPOA knew that.
This section makes me doubt the rest of your analysis. Sanctions were causing mass unrest in Iran. Their economy still isn't close to having recovered.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
I correct myself in another comment here.
To quote myself.
That is true. I did not add this qualifier because it wasn't really relevant to the argument. I'm focusing on the 'Security threat' perspective of Israel. The JCPOA proved to everyone involved that when the pressure is eased, a large chunk of money will be used for regional expansion.
Yes, the economic pressure is taking its toll, and yes there is a large degree of economic mismanagement in Iran. There's even a water crisis hitting Iran that the government is not able to solve easily. But, betting on economic pressure bringing the regime crashing down is not a mistake I think Israel would be willing to do again.
The regime survived, as I said, decades of tough pressure. This round of pressure will last at most 2 more years if I'm extremely generous. So there is the distinct risk of no long-term gains when the pressure is reversed.
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u/RufusTheFirefly Aug 31 '19
That's true but it's internal. OP is right that as soon as the sanctions eased, their regional expansion and financing and arming of groups like Hezbollah, Shiite militias in Iraq, Hamas and Islamic Jihad and the Houthis all appear to have increased. The internal effect of easing sanctions was mixed but the external effect was fairly clear.
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u/1Karam1 Aug 31 '19
Ok. First of all amazing analysis. Second I have one question in part A you said that two suicide drones exploded so in other words these drones were meant to explode but the local news (Lebanon, I guess you’re Lebanese too) said that they were reconnaissance drones which Hezbollah claims (and yes I am not joking) they brought down by throwing stones at them. So the question is what were those drones for?
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
The stones claim seemed far fetched at first, but videos ended up coming out of a drone flying at extremely low altitudes so it's possible.
To know what the drones are for, we need to decide who sent the drones. There are three theories (among the dozens that are floating around) that I consider valid:
A) Israel sent them and destroyed sensitive Hezb equipment used to produce precision rockets. (As the Times of London claimed.)
B) Israel sent them because ??? and damaged a media center. (Hezbollah's claim)
C) This is a false flag by Hezbollah itself to drum up support for some military action against Israel, who has been overstepping by bombing Iranian targets excessively in Syria and Iraq. (/u/rufusthefirefly presents this theory in this thread better than I can, and I highly recommend reading the exchange.)
I'm personally resting on (A) as the most likely possibility, but as I said elsewhere C is also a possibility. The only way we'll know for sure is in the coming days. To quote another comment of mine here:
I'll also be watching coming events with that in mind. If Hezbollah's response turns out to be 'excessive', and I would qualify the use of any rocket as excessive, then your theory (meaning theory C) becomes much more likely.
But if Hezbollah's response exudes a massive aura of "Please don't bomb us back!", then it's something else. Your comment is very enlightening, especially the bit on B&W. Thank you.
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u/ObdurateSloth Aug 31 '19
Interesting read, thanks for the post!
I hope I am not hijacking the post but I simply have a question about Israel that I doubt warrants a new post. How important and what purpose does Israeli nuclear submarines serve for Israeli geopolitics? If we put this in context of this post then I fail to see Israeli submarines having any relevance to either Syrian civil war or in the Palestine conflict.
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u/RufusTheFirefly Aug 31 '19
Israeli nuclear submarines have no relevance to Syria or the Palestinian conflict. They're strictly a trident-style nuclear deterrent. Israel is small enough that it wouldn't take a large nuclear arsenal to destroy the entire country and it has enough enemy countries close enough to its borders that a devastating first strike might appear tempting to a country like Iran. The submarines protect their ability to respond to a nuclear attack and thus, to retain their nuclear deterrent.
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u/Golda_M Aug 31 '19 edited Aug 31 '19
Great post OP.
This is a guess, but I think the Israeli strategic goal is relatively open/straightforward: Get "Iranian-backed militia's" onto the main agenda, alongside nuclear proliferation, of international negotiations. The tactical goals (eliminate certain people/weapons/stuff) is more opaque.
If I'm right and the former strategic goal is driving, we might see a prolonged escalated tension.
Also, modern Israeli military tactics often revolve around "diplomatic windows" during which the army can achieve some basket of tactical goals. If rocket attacks start, a "window" is open, and Israel will use it to cross as many tactical targets off their list as they can.
This means you often see two concurrent stories, and it's not obvious which one dictates the beginning/end of the conflict. The strategic goal could be semi-contrived, in order to open a window. The strategic goal could also be the reason, and the "tactical window" utilized opportunistically and incidentally. As I said, I think the latter is the case here.
Of course, it's a two-sided game. Either side can escalate, and Hezbollah might have its own reasons for escalation. Overall, most times they decided to engage militarily (with Israel, or in Syria), they have increased their power/influence. Now that they are not a critical force in Syria, they may feel confident enough to engage with Israel.
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u/RedFistCannon Aug 31 '19
I love how your mind works. Many of your theories and arguments are correct. Kudos my dude. This is coming from a Lebanese
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Aug 31 '19
Great post, OP. Thank you.
Does Russia fit into this at all?
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
It does. Where it fits is something I need to give more thought to.
I do know two things.
1) Russia and Iran are competitors in Syria. While Russia does support Iran to a minimal extent to 'annoy' the US, Russia not only benefits from the higher price of oil due to Iranian sanctions but also wants to see Iranian influence in Russia's Middle Eastern sphere of influence weakened. Remember, it won't take long for a strong and secure Iran to start meddling in the Caucasus as Turkey does, and Russia knows that.
2) A month ago, give or take, Bolton, his Russian counterpart, and his Israeli counterpart met in Tel Aviv. While we can't know what they talked about, we can know that these 'top honcho' meetings come at the end of weeks and months of lower level discussions to finalize the details and rubberstamp what was already agreed before the 'summit'. If we can safely make a conclusion from this, it's that there is an American-Russian-Israeli agreement on some matter in the Middle East. What it is, we can only leave to speculation.
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u/War_Tard Sep 02 '19
Brilliant post. Top class analysis. Thank you.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 02 '19
That's very kind of you, especially give my post skirmish edit.
I'm over here lambasting myself for some basic mistakes in analysis I committed in my post. I underestimated the so-called "balance of terror" and I underestimated the personal nature of geopolitics, which while it doesnt define long term trends, surely does affect short term ones.
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u/Perdi Aug 31 '19
Great write up, a conflict completely forgotten in the background at the moment but which still had the potential to drag mutiple nations into it. Its amazing how there is still a war in Syria but the media completely ignores it, especially here in Australia.
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u/b-jensen Aug 31 '19
Allow me add some more context in the Legal aspect of the situation which is in the core of the issue:
3) "Calls for the disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias"
4) "Supports the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory"
That's from UNSC Resolution 1559
The UNSCR 1701 called to UNSC Resolution 1559 and UNSC Resolution 1680
In 2006 Hezbollah Kidnapped 3 Israeli soldiers out of the blue one day (Hezb claim they wanted to ransom them) when Israel refused, Hezb started to bombard northern Israel, without anyone in the Lebanese government even knowing that today hey're going to war with Israel..
In 2018/19 Hezbollah was caught digging Multiple tunnels from Lebanon into Israel under the noses of UNIFIL in violation of un1701.
Resolutions about Lebanese militias/Hezbollah in attempts to stabilize the situation (Usually made after wars)
According to UN Res 425/426 (same in Res520 1982) from 1978 Lebanon had to ''ensure the return of its effective authority in the area'' (Not militias) while Israel had to withdraw from south Lebanon. Israel withdrew, but Lebanese militias were still armed. "Hezbollah, a Shiite group which exercises de facto sovereignty over much of South Lebanon, rejected Resolution 425 and continues to launch attacks against Israeli troops from time to time''
In 2004 UN Res 1559/1553 called again to disarm Hezbollah, yet 2 years after Res1559, Hezbollah attacked and Kidnapped 3 Israeli soldiers driving on the Israeli side of the border, launched rockets into northern Israel, and instigated the 2006 war.
After the 2006 war UN Res 1701 demanded yet again to disarm Hezbollah, a Resolution agreed by both Israel and Lebanon in order to end the war, and Lebanon host UNIFIL under that agreement.
Yet, even though According to UN 1701 Hezbollah need to disarm, it did not, not even for a second, but acquired even more weapons since 2006, and is/was digging tunnels into Israel, (an actual Casus Belli)
Israeli stand is, Since the UN Resolutions Failed to Disarm the Militias in Lebanon, Israel can fly above Lebanese airspace to conduct missions and monitor militia activity & situation. and that Lebanon is violating the agreement made after 2006 war everyday by keeping Hezb armed.
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u/poklane Sep 01 '19
My main fear right now is that a skirmish will indeed happen, but with both sides getting into an endless loop of retaliation. If a skirmish happens one side will have to swallow their pride and kinda admit defeat by not shooting back after the other side has shot at them.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 01 '19 edited Sep 01 '19
Mmhmm. That's the worrying possibility. Both sides talked themselves into this corner, but I still think Hezvollah can avoid this cycle if the response is calculated to be very light handed. Maybe. If Israel is truly going to hit these targets come what may, theyll start bombing Lebanon even if Hezbollh's response is Nasrallah insulting Netanyahu's mother.
These are the 2 unknowns I cant speak of in certainty. How will Hezbollah respond? Is Israel willing to pursue a war or is she bluffing?
Edit: There's also a strong chance Hezbollah responds after elections, making a cycle of escalation less likely.
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Sep 01 '19
[deleted]
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 01 '19
That's the problem here. Until Israel finds out how it can 'permanently' deal with Hezbollah, it has two choices.
A) Cyclical wars that keep Hezbollah's power within an acceptable margin.
B) Waiting until the perfect moment arrives, with the risk that Hezbollah's power balloons past an acceptable limit. (Which concurrently makes a 'long-term' solution harder.)
Option A is what I'm predicting.
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Sep 01 '19
2006 made it stronger, with increased control politically and militarily. It litterally rebuilt within weeks.. What's in it for Israel? What's to win now, with improved range and targets capabilities for the hezb?
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 01 '19
2006 did not 'make' Hezbollah stronger. The events after 2006 did, that were not related to the war at all.
What's in it for Israel? What's to win now, with improved range and targets capabilities for the hezb?
It's quite simple. Roll back these capabilities, albeit if only for a couple of years. Hezbollah and Iran's pockets are much emptier than usual these days, and Iran is on the verge of opening a detente with the West. That's two big reasons they can't tolerate a sustained war.
Perfect time for Israel to bomb the big list of targets it's been keeping since 2006 and sue for a quick peace, something it wouldn't be able to do under less favorable circumstances.
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Sep 01 '19
2006 "rolling back" cost 200 casualties for Israel, while it almost didn't roll back anything at all for the hezb, or minimally so. You think they could take casualties 10-fold now? Which crazy politician, in an election period, would embark on that? There is no military decision available for either parties. It's as simple as this. And a lot more at stake for Israel
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u/Jessewhite007 Sep 01 '19
Hezbollah fired an antitank missile on IDF .Casualities unknown
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 01 '19
On it already.
I'm going to pause analyzing for now until I can figure out how serious this is and if I have to move North or not.
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Sep 01 '19
Why Israel is conducting these strikes and why Iran is not responding to them is outside the scope of this post, but if you can't answer these questions I do advise you read up on the topic before reading on.
Anyone could recommend something to read on this?
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 01 '19
Remind me if I forget. Kind of preoccupied at the moment with the exchange of fire.
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Sep 03 '19
Hi, reminding myself.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 03 '19
I'll try to write something up for you in the next 7 days. Couldn't find anything decent that summarizes it in one link. (Although it's not that complicated an issue)
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Sep 03 '19
Thank you very much sir. Really appreciate it!
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 03 '19
While this isn't exactly what you asked for, I figured I'd send it to you until I write something better that exactly answers your question. Just gotta get through exams first.
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u/SurgeryFx Sep 01 '19
Congratulation on your prediction, there definitely was a skirmish
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u/EmmanuelBassil Sep 01 '19
I was actually predicting the bombing of strategic targets, not the Gaza-esque theatre. So from my perspective, my 'prediction' was wrong.
However, this is mainly because I did not expect a response so early, which put a wrench in the logic due to elections in Israel and Aashoura in Lebanon. (But mainly elections in Israel.)
So the underlying trends I outlined still exist, and we just dodged a bullet tonight. See you next time these trends boil to the surface again!
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u/masterboy904 Aug 31 '19
Also count in Netanyahu will probaly be prosecuted if he doesnt get re-elected. I think he will go far to win. Nice analysis btw :)
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u/TheMogician Aug 31 '19
I think at this point, both sides are just waiting for "a provocation gone wrong".
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u/Bobbbobbobby Aug 31 '19
Appreciate the effort but your post lacks any sources to most of your claims, for or against it.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
Most sources are a google search away, although I understand a fully sourced post is better than not.
If there's something specific you can't find, I'll be glad to help you source it.
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u/sanem48 Aug 31 '19
Thanks for starting the topic, here's my two cents:
- Iran and Hezbollah don't want war. They essentially won the conflict in Syria, and helping Assad mop up the Idlib rebels as we speak. Iran and Lebanon are under financial stress, they don't want conflict now. Plus if a US democrat becomes the next president, the nuclear deal might be back on, so they just need to sit this one out. They know any fight now risks involving the US, which will cause heavy damage to Iran. I suspect the tanker incidents were a covert tit for tat war being fought trying to provoke Iran into war, but it failed, because Trump didn't want to go for it, or because Iran didn't give enough provocation to do so.
- Israel does want war, and urgently. I don't know about Netanyahu, but if he doesn't get reelected he risks prosecution, that might give war hawks leverage over him. I don't rule out a false flag for the Beirut strikes, but then more likely by rogue IDF elements than Hezbollah itself. If Netanyahu approved a strike it would have probably been much heavier, as we saw in Iraq and Syria, small drones launched from a boat sounds like Mossad. Israel essentially lost the war in Syria, and the political war to stop Iran from getting nukes. They are now facing a more powerful Iran/Hezbollah/Syria than ever, building up massive missile reserves on their doorstep. Israel will not suffer this position for long without action, preemptive strikes and first strike war are their proven strategies.
- The US leadership wants war. If this include Trump is hard to say, but I believe so. I suspect he cancelled the strikes because the public would not have accepted it, it would have made the US seem too much like the aggressor. Now that they have a coalition of ships in the Straight, any incident will draw Iran against the international community and make them look like the bad guys to the public.
- It seems likely that the Israeli war hawks know a war is coming, so they're either taking advantage of it to get in a few free punches before all hell breaks loose, or to provoke one. If Hezbollah doesn't react, they'll probably repeat until they do, and they'll try to involve Iran as well somehow. Seeing as Hezbollah seems to preparing for war, they are expecting it too now.
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u/EmmanuelBassil Aug 31 '19
Your first point is basically you offering a different perspective on the same reality I outlined in my post: The US pressure on Iran is not going to last long. While I say this is a reason Israel might be interested in war, you correctly say this is a reason Hezbollah/Iran are not. This is why I expect a purposefully weak response, but I might be very wrong. I would just add that Trump is a consistently anti-war president, and that's the reason he didn't embroil himself in Iran, not because Iran didn't provoke him enough.
For your second point, I thank you for mentioning rogue IDF elements. Not because I agree with you, but so that any readers can see how ridiculous the 'rogue IRGC' theory sounds, which is used by Western observers every other day at least. The IRGC and the IDF don't have rogue elements that can start wars. If the IDF is behind this, it was a decision done from upstairs. I agree with the rest of your second point, and I also agree that if it is an Israel party behind this it's the Mossad.
Your third point, I also agree. Statements from the US greenlighting Israel say as much. But I doubt the US will get directly involved. I've typed this elsewhere, but briefly, the biggest winner of an Iran-US war will be China. The US Army just declared that Iran is the sole winner of the Iraq-US war; so I doubt this reality is lost on them. Obama declared a pivot to Asia and Trump is still intent on implementing it. Getting into a direct shooting match with Iran will greatly harm that goal and the US. But sure, the US did publicly support Israel this week if it so chooses to go to war, so indirect support will remain.
Fourth point, agreed.
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u/sanem48 Aug 31 '19
I would say Trump is very much a war president. He didn't have to start any because Obama already sent troops everywhere Trump might want to fight. The only exception being Iran, and Trump has gone out of his way to pick a fight there.
I can guarantee you that there are elements within the governments of Israel or the USA that would happily push their country into war, against the wishes of their elected leaders. JFK said as much following the Bay of Pigs incident, suggesting the Pentagon tried to trick him into a conflict. For Iran it's less likely because they know they'll suffer greatly in a war with the US, so there would be a lot less support for such an operation.
War with Iran would be great for the US, as their main exports are oil and weapons. Not for the people, but then they've been forced into war for the last 18 years against their will, so I doubt they'll get much say in the matter this time. China and importantly Russia are waiting for the right time to decouple the Dollar, such a conflict might give them the excuse they need.
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u/lbjs_bunghole Aug 31 '19
More posts like this need to be on this sub.