r/internationallaw • u/posixthreads • May 26 '25
Op-Ed [OpinioJuris] Genocidal Intent in Armed Conflict: Unpacking the ICJ’s “Only Reasonable Inference” Standard
https://opiniojuris.org/2025/05/26/genocidal-intent-in-armed-conflict-unpacking-the-icjs-only-reasonable-inference-standard/
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u/posixthreads May 26 '25 edited May 27 '25
This article is written by the legal team of Amnesty International (AI). It seems to be largely in response to Professor Stefan Talmon's opinion that AI's report is flawed in its understanding of dolus specialis. Specifically, he disagrees with the notion of "dual intent", whereby a actus reus of genocide can be perpetrated with both genocidal and military intent. Side note, Professor Talmon represented Myanmar in their genocide case alongside William Schabas, the latter recently explicitly stated there was a genocide.
Now to clarify, Professor Stefan isn't arguing that duel intent cannot exist, but that the legal standard for a finding of genocide before the ICJ is such that genocidal intent is the only reasonable inference one can make. To perhaps provide an example, let's compare Bosnia v. Serbia and Croatia v. Serbia.
In the final judgement, the judges pointed to several weaknesses in Croatia's case:
They failed to establish that forced displacement (ethnic cleansing) in the context of the conflict falls under Article II of the Genocide Convention.
The only direct evidence of dolus specialis was an isolated incident of a paramilitary leader ordering the explicit destruction of Croats during siege of Vukovar and an internal JNA report stating Serbian forces were planning a genocide. The judges reviewing that document could not understand how the conclusion of genocide was reached.
The judges found that when given the opportunity, Serbian forces largely opted for forced displacement rather than destruction of Croats.
Not a fan of this, but the judges looked at the scale of deaths. They said even if they take Croatia's number at face value (12500/168000), 7.4% of the population in the affected area was deemed not enough.
In the Bosnia case, the actions of the Srebrenica Massacre spoke for themselves:
This was a direct act of murder, which is the top actus reus in Article II.
The way in which the targets were selected was so specific that it could only lead to the conclusion of genocide. To give a better idea, consider what would have happened if Serbian paramilitary forces instead murdered every pre-menopausal Bosniak females. It would certainly be a finding for genocide as well.
Serbian forces had zero business overrunning Srebrenica. It was a deconflicted zone under UN protection.
I don't know what the scale is, and I have trouble finding the sources online. However, I recall William Schabas disagreed with the genocide claim because the amount of deaths in Srebrenica was not too high in his opinion. He seems to be have made a similar claim on behalf of Myanmar. Again, I don't know what total number of Bosniaks was at Srebrenica prior to the genocidal massacre, so I can't compare it to the Croatia case.
Now, to some extent, I agree that the "only reasonable inference" test might be a good mechanism against duel intent claims. A state facilitating a genocide can certainly throw its hands up and say "we were just targeting enemy forces and we were a bit sloppy", however if the judges see something like the perpetrator wiping out whole localities, they're (hopefully) not going to find the genocidal state's arguments reasonable. However, this seems unsatisfactory to me because when you use such imprecise legal reasoning it opens the door to judges voting based on gut feeling.
This seems to be what happened on the question of scale in the Croatia case, where Judge Bhandari's opinion (I think) was coloured by the massive death toll in the Rwandan Genocide. Personally, 7.4% does seems like a lot to me and what's worse is that they don't define what number range they're really looking for. Certainly 70-100% is a finding for genocide, but what about 50%, 30% or 15%? Are they only counting dead or physically harmed too? If half the population become amputees, do they count? If half of the children suffer malnutrition and therefore become physically stunted for life does that count? Malnutrition heightens the risk of neurological disorders such as autism (breastfeeding reduces risk of a newborn developing autism massively), do excess autism diagnoses count as well? Do they add the percentages up or do they pick the maximum value between them?
While I see where Professor Talmon's is coming from, he seems to think the standard set by the ICJ is somehow good and unambiguous.